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THE PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS PREMISED ON




In recent years, courts in many states have adopted tort and con-
tract legal theories reversing, in whole or in part, the common law rule
of "at will employment." One theory is the "public policy" doctrine,
under which a terminated employee may obtain legal and equitable re-
lief from a former employer when his discharge violates a precept of
public policy. Courts have-in a few unfortunate cases-accepted such
claims when the public policy involved was employment discrimination
prohibited by federal and state fair employment statutes. In such in-
stances, terminated employees have improperly been afforded both stat-
utory and common law relief. These cases contradict the very rationale
for the "public policy" theory, and seriously interfere with the remedial
processes provided by the statutes. There are strong public policies
militating against the application of the "public policy" theory to em-
ployment discrimination cases. This article will analyze these recent
public policy cases and the countervailing public policies calling for their
renunciation.
I. THE COMMON LAW RULE
Under the traditional "at will employment" rule, it was firmly estab-
lished that, when a private sector employer hired an employee to work
for an indefinite period of time, and the employee did not have a con-
tract limiting the circumstances under which he could be discharged, the
employer was free to terminate the employee at any time, without legal
liability, for good cause, bad cause, or no reason at all, in the absence of
an express statutory prohibition. ' The rule has been applied to "perma-
nent" workers, 2 "lifetime" employees, 3 and workers hired for employ-
ment until retirement election.
4
* Partner, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; J.D., University of Colorado,
B.S., Boston University.
1. See, e.g., Spivey v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3407 (S.D. Ga.
1984); Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3076 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Maguire v.
American Family Life Ass. Co., 442 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Silver v. Mohasco
Corp., 94 A.D.2d 820, 462 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
2. See, e.g., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
3. See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Ohio Table Pad Co. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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Historically, discharged workers have asserted numerous theories
in civil actions against their former employers attempting to circumvent
the at will employment rule. For example, workers protected by statutes
authorizing civil relief have sought redress for wrongful termination.
5
Further, some employees have asserted that the at will employment rule
is inapplicable because they had agreements, written or verbal, with
their employers for work for a fixed period of time, calling for "just
cause" termination. 6 Others have alleged that their employment agree-
ments contained express or implied provisions that they would be em-
ployed so long as they satisfactorily performed the services expected of
them, protecting them from discharge for reasons other than good faith
dissatisfaction by the employer. 7 Some plaintiffs have asserted that their
employers covenanted to discharge the employee only for just cause.
8
Finally, some have contended that they were improperly discharged
without just cause because they provided the employer with considera-
5. Statutory prohibitions include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982) (discrimination based on age for persons age 40-70); Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (discrimination to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization); Fair Labor Standards Act,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3) & 216(b) (1982) (discrimination against any employee
because of assertion of rights under FLSA); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982) (discrimination against any employee because of assertion of
rights under OSHA); Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2021, 2022 (1982) (most veterans entitled to restoration of prior employment after
release from military service and cannot be discharged without cause for one year after
reemployment); Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982)
(discrimination against a participant or beneficiary of employee benefit plan for exercising
any right under ERISA or for purpose of interfering with attainment of employee benefit
plan right); and numerous parallel statutes and ordinances adopted on the state and local
levels.
One commentator subscribes to the unique theory that Title VII eliminated the at will
employment rule because the statute compels employers to have just cause when disciplin-
ing, for example, any minority employee and because Title VII requires that majority and
minority workers receive equal treatment. See Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers
Are Entitled to just Cause' Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978). The fallacy
of this syllogism is that Title VII, as the other discrimination statutes, simply prohibits
employers from basing employment decisions on specified grounds, but does not attempt
to impose a just cause or business necessity standard on every employment decision. An
employer who fires his workers under the at will employment rule for bad reasons or for
no reason at all does not violate Title VII, so long as his arbitrary discipline is not applied
discriminatorily, is not grounded in a discriminatory motive, and does not have a disparate
impact on any particular minority group. See, e.g., Heath v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 16
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8338 (S.D. Ohio 1978); High v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aFd, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
Discrimination statutes and ordinances such as Title VII compel equal discipline, not just
discipline.
6. See, e.g., Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1972); Eales v. Tanana Valley
Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Thomas v. Bourdette, 45 Or.
App. 195, 608 P.2d 178, 180 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. Pippin, 620 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
8. See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Ryan
v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical
Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Comfort & Fleming Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Hoxsey,
26 Wash. App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980).
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tion beyond the performance of services. 9
The traditional legal exceptions to the at will employment rule are
not available to the average American employee who informally agrees
with his employer to work for a specified wage, without engaging in pro-
tracted employment contract negotiations regarding job security.' 0 Be-
cause of the harsh effects from application of the common law rule,
courts in many jurisdictions have recently adopted tort and contract the-
ories protective of such workers.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY
Many courts have recently ruled that employers should not be per-
mitted to discipline or discharge employees for reasons violative of pub-
lic policy, and that an employee has a tort action for damages to redress
injuries caused by such discipline or discharge." Although the theory
has been articulated in a wide variety of ways, most courts have accepted
the cause of action on the grounds that an employee-even one hired
for an indefinite period of time-should not be without legal recourse
when fired because of the worker's exercise of a legal right or perform-
ance of a legal duty.
12
One frequently litigated employment-related right is an employee's
right to seek and receive available workmen's compensation benefits. In
a landmark decision, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 13 the Supreme
Court of Indiana held that a discharged employee had sufficiently al-
leged a legal claim for relief when she contended that she was dis-
charged by the defendant without reason one month after she obtained
a settlement on a workmen's compensation claim and that she was fired
in retaliation for the claim. Because the legislature had chosen to pro-
vide workmen's compensation benefits to injured workers, thus articu-
lating a public policy in favor of the entitlement of such benefits, the
court held, the alleged retaliatory termination would violate the public
policy expressed by the legislature.
If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing
workmen's compensation claims, a most important public pol-
icy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged would
have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right.
9. See, e.g., Moody v. Bogue, 310 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981).
10. It has been estimated that approximately 60 to 65% of all American employees
are hired on an at will basis. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change
in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979); Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816 n.2
(1980).
11. The first reported judicial decision embracing the public policy theory was
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (i959),
to be discussed infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. Approximately 14 years passed
between the Petermann decision and the next state appellate court decision following public
policy analysis, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973), also to be discussed infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
13. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). See supra note 11.
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Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensa-
tion-opting, instead, to continue their employment without
incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer is ef-
fectively relieved of his obligation. 14
A large number of courts have followed the Frampton ruling.15
"Rights" protected in public policy cases have included an em-
ployee's freedom to commence a civil action against his employer, ' 6 the
right to be free from polygraph examination, 17 and the right of free
speech. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Novosel v. Nation-
wide Insurance Co.,' 8 that a plaintiff sufficiently pled causes of action
based on the theory of public policy wrongful discharge when he as-
serted that his employment was terminated by the defendant in retalia-
tion for the worker's refusal to lobby in favor of a no-fault insurance
reform measure before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.
Sidestepping the question of state action, 19 the court ruled that the
14. Id. at 427.
15. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984); Bowler v.
Firemens Fund Am. Ins. Co., 558 F. Supp. 724 (ND. Ill. 1983); Rettinger v. American Can
Co., 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983); Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 174 Cal. Rptr. 428
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 1983); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Darnell v.
Impact Indus., Inc., 457 N.E.2d 125 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shaw-
nee County Dep't of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone
Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668,
428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978);
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 687 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). Some courts have even ruled
that the discharge of a worker because of the filing of a benefits claim against a previous
employer is actionable. See, e.g., Darnell, 457 N.E.2d 125.
Although the Frampton case and its progeny seem rational, the public policy theory has
been stretched to unreasonable extremes. Some courts have prohibited the termination of
an employee repeatedly absent from work for prolonged periods of time, if the absences
are due to a job-related injury for which workmen's compensation benefits are available.
See, e.g., Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 109 Mich. App. 776, 312 N.W.2d 380 (1981);
Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Such a ruling puts an
employer in a difficult position, should a key employee suffer an on-the-job injury. If the
employee's work requires immediate attention, and if market forces dictate the hiring of a
replacement on a permanent basis, the employer will have two workers performing the
functions of one upon the rehabilitation of the first employee. Conversely, if no replace-
ment is hired, business is impaired. Also, one court has held that the discharge of an
employee for submission of false information on an employment application might have
violated public policy because the misrepresented facts involved her filing of a worker's
compensation benefits claim with a former employer. See Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc.,
457 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). The lesson to be learned from Darnell may be that, if
one wants to falsify information on an employment application, one should be careful to
select a subject involving an arguable public policy.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979);
Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
18. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
19. All of the cases relied upon by the court involved public, not private sector, em-
ployees. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the public employment free speech cases ex-
pressed a public policy applicable to private sector workers, as well.
Although Novosel is not a government employee, the public employee cases
do not confine themselves to the narrow question of state action. Rather, these
cases suggest that an important public policy is in fact implicated wherever the
power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of employee political activi-
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political activity and free speech freedoms embodied in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution created a public policy
protecting the employee from such wrongful termination.
The development of the public policy wrongful discharge theory in-
volving employee "duties" has traveled at breakneck speed, by compari-
son with the evolution of the "rights" public policy theory. In Petermann
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,20 the seminal public policy deci-
sion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer terminated him
because he had refused to falsely testify in legislative hearings. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings be-
cause the plaintiff was an employee hired for an indefinite term. The
California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the at will employ-
ment rule was restricted by statute and "by considerations of public pol-
icy. '2 1 Because the commission and solicitation of perjury were
criminal acts, the court held that it would violate the public interest to
permit an employer to discharge a worker for refusing to commit per-
jury at the employer's insistence.
To hold that one's continued employment could be made con-
tingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon
the part of both the employee and employer and would serve to
contaminate the honest administration of public affairs.
2 2
The Petermann decision was the springboard for a number of public
policy "duty" cases involving workers allegedly fired for serving on a
jury;2 3 for resisting business practices considered by the employee to be
illegal or improper;24 for attempting to obtain a "reasonably smoke free
ties. . . . The protection of important political freedoms, however, goes well be-
yond the question whether the threat comes from state or private bodies. The
inquiry before us is whether the concern for the rights of political expression and
association which animated the public employee cases is sufficient to state a pub-
lic policy under Pennsylvania law. While there are no Pennsylvania cases squarely
on this point, we believe that the clear direction of the opinions promgulated by
the state's courts suggests that this question be answered in the affirmative.
721 F.2d at 900. Compare Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2915 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1984) (nurse allegedly fired for writing newspaper article advocating patients'
"right to die"; no protection under Texas constitution unless state action established).
20. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See supra note 11.
21. 344 P.2d at 27.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2031 (7th Cir. 1984)
(pilot refused to fly defective aircraft); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp.
572 (D. Md. 1982) (employee ordered cessation of business with customers receiving
bribes from corporation and refused to file illegal tax returns); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee protested to management
that product labeling violated state law); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee supplied local law enforcement authorities with
information indicating fellow employee had violated criminal laws); Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., I I 1 1ll. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (vice president-controller
reported embezzlement to president); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153,
443 A.2d 728 (1982) (pharmacist protested violation of state pharmacy regulations to su-
pervisor); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (medical techni-
cian refused to perform catheterizations in violation of state law); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots,
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environment" in the workplace;2 5 for controlling health care costs by
rejecting a union's unlawful bargaining demands; 26 and for refusing to
prepare a false, and possibly libelous, statement against a fellow
worker. 2 7 The most dramatic example of the mushrooming "duty" pub-
lic policy wrongful discharge theory is Wiskotoni v. Michigan National
Bank-West,28 in which a branch bank manager was fired on suspicion of
criminal conduct, when an extensive F.B.I. investigation revealed that he
had embezzled bank funds and participated in a numbers racket, and he
was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury. No indictment
was issued. 29 In his public policy wrongful discharge action, the man-
ager won a jury verdict. The verdict was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which held that the plaintiff had a duty to appear
before the grand jury and was wrongfully terminated for performing this
duty. The court ruled that numerous Michigan statutes regarding the
operation of the grand jury reflected a public policy supportive of the
grand jury system, and that the system "would be affected adversely if an
employer could discharge with impunity an employee for the reason that
the employee had been called to appear and testify before a grand
jury ... "30
Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (plaintiff refused to pump bilges of ship at
location prohibited by federal law); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,
685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (controller instituted accurate accounting procedures in compliance
with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978), 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) (credit manager reported violations of state and
federal consumer credit and protection laws to higher management).
A number of courts have specifically recognized public policy claims for relief in cases
involving employees allegedly opposing antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii
1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982). At least one
court has held that such employees have a treble damage action against their former em-
ployer for wrongful discharge because of the treble damage provisions of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), afjd on rehearing, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984).
25. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. See, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
28. 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. Although one might imagine that the criminal law presumption of innocence is a
public policy on which wrongful discharge claims could be based, most courts have ruled
that a discharge based on suspicion of employee crime is lawful, even if the worker was
acquitted of the criminal charges involved. See, e.g., Cisco v. United Parcel Services, 476
A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Cf. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681
(1980), discussed infra note 54.
30. 716 F.2d at 383. The Wiskotoni decision is anomalous in at least two respects.
First, the opinion treats the plaintiffas if he-when subpoenaed to testify-was a disinter-
ested witness. Rather, the record was clear that Mr. Wiskotoni was subpoenaed because
he was a target of the grand jury investigation and the investigation involved matters re-
lated directly to his employment. Most persons with savings in a financial institution
would prefer that it not be managed by a thief or a suspected thief, and yet the WViskotoni
opinion disregards the legitimate business reason for terminating the branch manager.
Second, the opinion places much emphasis on the fact that the bank waited approxi-
mately two months, between the F.B.I. investigation and the grand jury hearing, before
terminating the manager. Hence, the message to employers from Wiskotoni is that they
must take disciplinary action against employees suspected of employment-related criminal
activity on the first sign of suspicion, rather than waiting for any corroborative indications.
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In addition to those jurisdictions formally adopting the public pol-
icy theory of wrongful discharge, many state appellate courts have indi-
cated that, when presented with the appropriate set of circumstances,
their respective states will follow the lead of cases such as Petermann,
Frampton, and Wiskotoni.
3
Due to the ethereal nature of "public policy," 3 2 employers must an-
ticipate the further expansion of this wrongful discharge theory.
3 3
III. PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS BASED ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT STATUTES
In all of the cases discussed above, the courts-by fashioning a
wrongful discharge remedy in substitution for the historic at will em-
ployment doctrine-sought to effectuate existing "public policy." In an
effort to discern public policy, the courts commonly examined statutory
31. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
The current status of the public policy theory in Colorado is uncertain. In Lampe v.
Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978), a charge nurse
contended that she was fired for refusing to reduce the overtime work of her staff, and that
the discharge violated public policy because reduced staffing would have resulted in lower
quality patient care. The Colorado Court of Appeals equivocated on the adoption of the
public policy theory, holding simply that the plaintiff had not asserted a claim invoking a
public policy. Subsequent decisions have reiterated the at will employment doctrine, see,
e.g., Hughes v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 686 P.2d 814 (Colo. App. 1984);Johnson
v. Jefferson County Board of Health, 662 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1983); Electrolux Corp. v. Law-
son, 654 P.2d 340 (Colo. App. 1982), but the decision in Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing,
Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. App. 1984), again threw the matter into confusion. In Corbin, the
plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he refused to follow the employer's in-
struction to check sensors located in the tank of his gasoline truck, that the instructions
violated OSHA requirements, and that the discharge therefore violated public policy. The
Court of Appeals-without clear explanation of its analysis-affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, holding that the broad statements of policy to which he
referred were "inadequate to justify adoption of an exception to the rule that an indefinite
general hiring is terminable at will by either party to the employment." 684 P.2d at 267.
As of the time this article was written, a "whistle-blowing" wrongful discharge case
was pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals; the plaintiff had prevailed in the court
below. Wuchert v. Great Western Sugar Co., Civil Action No. 82-CV-7152 (Denver Dist.
Ct. 8, February 3, 1984), appeal filed, Case No. 84-CA-1140.
One Colorado federal court has interpreted existing state law as supporting a public
policy wrongful discharge claim. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776,
781-82 (D. Colo. 1982). Others have equivocated on the question. See, e.g., Ritter v. Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co., 593 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Colo. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 567 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Colo. 1983). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently
ruled that Colorado Law does not recognize the public policy theory. Garcia v. Aetna
Finance Co., Case No. 81-1260 (10th Cir., Dec. 17, 1984).
32. For example, in Petermann, the California Court of Appeals defined public policy
as "the principles under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law
for the good of the community. . . . [W]hatever contravenes good morals or any estab-
lished interests of society is against public policy." 344 P.2d at 27.
33. Other developing tort and contract theories challenging employment termina-
tions, such as bad faith and malice, see, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (1974), the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see, e.g., Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), implied contract, see,
e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App.
1981), and negligent failure to warn employee of job performance deficiencies, see, e.g.,
Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982), are beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised by At Will Employees: A New
Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. LJ. 265 (May 1981).
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law: statutes providing workmen's compensation benefits, statutes
prohibiting perjury, statutes creating a grand jury system, for example.
The statutes relied upon by the courts in those cases (1) did not directly
address the subject of employment termination, and (2) did not ex-
pressly provide remedies to redress the wrongful termination of em-
ployment. By contrast, some recent judicial opinions have recognized
public policy wrongful discharge claims premised on federal and state
employment discrimination statutes, which directly deal with employ-
ment termination, and expressly provide remedies for wrongful termi-
nation. Three of these cases will be analyzed.
3 4
The plaintiff in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 5 asserted that her
supervisor sexually harassed her, gave her derogatory work evaluations,
denied her a pay increase, and ultimately terminated her, because of her
refusal to submit to his advances. Three claims for relief were presented
to the jury: (1) unlawful sex discrimination under the Oregon Fair Em-
ployment Practice Act, 3 6 (2) public policy wrongful discharge, and
(3) extreme and outrageous conduct. Interrogatories submitted to the
jury resulted in findings for the defendants on the first and third claims,
but in favor of the plaintiff on the public policy claim. Defendants
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the only public policy
raised by the plaintiff was sex discrimination in employment, which
(1) was specifically addressed in the Oregon Fair Employment Practice
Act, and (2) had been rejected by the jury. The motion for summary
judgment was granted.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed, both courts ruling that the Fair Employment Practice
Act expressed a strong state public policy against sex discrimination
34. These three cases are simply illustrative. See also Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (facts supportive of
violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing also support ADEA claim, but causes of
action independent); Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan.
1984) (racial discrimination against public policy, wrongful discharge claim independent
of civil rights laws); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(public policy claim based on Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
35. 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984), aff'g 66 Or. App. 911, 677 P.2d 704 (1984).
36. Oregon has a comprehensive administrative and judicial system for redressing
employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.010-.121 (1983). In order to assert a claim under the Act, an employee may file a
complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries within one year following the
unlawful discrimination. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.040(l) (1983). The Commissioner of the
Bureau of Labor & Industries is responsible for conducting an investigation of the com-
plaint, and will exert effort to conciliate the dispute between the parties. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.050(1) (1983). If conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, three alternative proceedings
may result. First, the Commissioner may bring a civil suit against the employer. OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.095 (1983). Second, the complaint may be taken to an administrative hearing
before the Bureau of Labor & Industries. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.060 (1983). A civil action
may be brought to enforce any order resulting from a Bureau hearing. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.070 (1983). Third, the employee may bring a civil action against the employer. OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.121 (1983). The back pay recovered in any such civil action is limited to
a two-year period before the filing of the employee's complaint with the Commission, or if
no such complaint has been filed, to a two-year period preceding the commencement of
the civil action. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(1) (1983). The plaintiff in Holien prosecuted her
state employment discrimination claim on the basis of this third procedure.
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subject to a wrongful discharge action.3 7 After reviewing the legislative
history of the statutes on which the plaintiffs first claim was based,3 8 the
courts found that the legislature did not intend the fair employment
practice statutes to supersede the public policy theory earlier embraced
by the Oregon courts. In the absence of express legislative history indi-
cating that the statutes supplanted the public policy theory in the area of
sex discrimination, the courts would not interpret the statutes to have
exclusive effect.
3 9
The defendants contended that it was inappropriate to base a public
policy wrongful discharge claim on the Fair Employment Practice Act
when the Act itself (and the federal discrimination laws) provided equi-
table relief, such as injunctions, reinstatement, and back pay, while the
plaintiff's public policy tort claim sought compensatory and punitive
damages. 40 This was of little concern to the courts, which concluded
that the Oregon legislature and Congress had both simply failed to ap-
preciate the full injuries suffered by a sex discrimination victim and to
provide the full relief necessary to make a sex discrimination victim
whole.
ORS 659.121 and Title VII fail to capture the personal nature
of the injury done to a wrongfully discharged employee as an
individual and the remedies provided by the statutes fail to ap-
preciate the relevant dimensions of the problem. Reinstate-
ment, back pay, and injunctions vindicate the rights of the
victimized group without compensating the plaintiff for such
personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a
sense of degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care. Legal as
well as equitable remedies are needed to make the plaintiff
whole.4 1
37. Oregon has long recognized the tort theory of public policy wrongful discharge.
See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
38. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(1) (1983). See discussion supra note 36. The Supreme
Court also acknowledged that sex discrimination in employment was prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1982). 689 P.2d at 1297-98.
39. In making this ruling, the courts failed to discuss a provision of the Oregon Fair
Employment Practice Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(4) (1983), indicating that a statutory
claim, such as the first claim raised by the plaintiff, was an effective waiver of any alterna-
tive proceedings to enforce rights under the statute:
This section shall not be construed to limit or alter in any way the authority
or power of the commissioner or to limit or alter in any way any of the rights of an
individual complainant until and unless the complainant commences civil suit or
action. The filing of a civil suit or action shall constitute both an election of
remedies as to the rights of that individual with respect to those matters alleged
in the complaint filed with the commissioner, and a waiver with respect to the
right to file a complaint with the commissioner pursuant to ORS 659.040(1) or
659.045(1).
40. The jury concluded that the plaintiff had lost wages in the amount of $292. and
general damages of $500, but nevertheless awarded $25,000 as punitive damages. 677
P.2d at 705.
41. 689 P.2d at 1303-04. The Supreme Court also rationalized that the Oregon legis-
lature, when it provided equitable relief by statute in 1977, did not intend to supplant legal
wrongful discharge remedies, because the legislature was unaware of common law devel-
opments at the time. Id. at 1300-04. Such an asertion is anomalous. Long before adop-
tion of the Oregon Fair Employment Practice Act, the Oregon courts created and
455
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Finally, the verdict on the statutory sex discrimination claim was held
not to legally bar or contradict the verdict on the wrongful discharge
claim.
4 2
A similar case is McKinney v. National Dairy Council.43  There, the
plaintiff contended that he was discharged because of his age, and that
public policy-as expressed in federal and state statutes44 -- denounced
such terminations. 4 5 The federal court analyzed the statutes relied
upon by the plaintiff, and properly concluded that the statutes provided
elaborate administrative and judicial procedures and remedies for dis-
discussed common law wrongful discharge relief in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d
512 (1975), and Campbell v. Ford Ind., Inc., 274 Or. 253, 546 P.2d 141 (1976). It seems
that the Oregon Supreme Court has a very low opinion of the collective intelligence of the
Oregon legislature.
A concurring Supreme Court justice expressed an alternative view-that the sex dis-
crimination statutes did not apply to Ms. Holien's claims because she was allegedly dis-
charged, not because of her sex, but because she had opposed her supervisor's sexual
advances. 689 P.2d 1305-07. This distinction is disingenuous. It is widely recognized that
the firing of an employee for resisting sexual demands is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by the equal employment opportunity laws, see, e.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc.,
721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(2) & (g) (1984); Miller v. Bank of Am.,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); see also infra note 68. Disciplining a worker for protesting
violations of the equal employment opportunity laws is also illegal, see, e.g., Gifford v. Atch-
ison, T. & S.F. Ry., 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982); Rucker v. Higher Education Aids Bd.,
669 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1982); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
42. The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion did not address this issue. The Court of
Appeals' decisions stated: "The trial court's determination of the facts on the first claim
did not preclude the jury from weighing the evidence in deciding the facts on the second
claim. Only when there is insufficient evidence to go to the jury may the trial court pre-
clude a jury determination." 677 P.2d at 708 n.5. Such platitudes overlook the fact that
sexual harassment was the single issue on both the first and second claims for relief, that
the evidence as to the first claim was the same evidence as to the second, and that the
substantive law governing the first claim was purportedly the same as that applicable to the
second. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
43. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
44. The federal statute relied upon by the plaintiff was the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). No explanation is provided in
the opinion as to whether the plaintiff ever sought relief under the administrative and
judicial procedures of the ADEA. See infra note 46.
The plaintiff relied on two sets of Massachusetts statutes regarding age discrimina-
tion. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24A (West 1982), in effect at the time of the plain-
tiff's termination, stated: "It is hereby declared to be against public policy to dismiss from
employment any person between the ages of forty-five and sixty-five, or to refuse to em-
ploy him, because of his age." As of the time of the plaintiffs discharge, the adjoining
statutory sections provided for enforcement of Section 24A by the Commissioner of Labor
& Industry, through public hearings and the publication of names of violators. No statutes
provided for private enforcement of Section 24A, and the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial
Court had expressly held there was no civil right of action for a violation of the section.
Johnson v. United States Steel Corp., 348 Mass. 168, 202 N.E.2d 816 (1964).
A separate state age discrimination prohibition was found in the Massachusetts Fair
Employment Practice Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1-10 (West 1982). In 1966,
Chapter 697, L. 1950 extended the prohibitions of the Fair Employment Practice Act to
employment discrimination on the basis of age. By its express terms, the Act did not
repeal Section 24A. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1982).
45. Rather than utilizing the terminology of "public policy wrongful discharge," the
plaintiff contended that a discharge on the basis of age violated "the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing," adopted in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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charges on the basis of age. 46 The court observed that adoption of the
wrongful discharge theory advanced by the plaintiff would permit liti-
gants to circumvent the administrative and judicial procedures and rem-
edies provided by the Massachusetts statutes and the ADEA.
4 7
Nevertheless, having given lip service to the doctrine of federalism,
the court proceeded to hold that the plaintiff could raise a tort claim of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against his
employer based on the public policy against age discrimination articu-
lated in the various statutes, without attempting to comply with the ad-
ministrative and judicial restrictions and limitations placed on recovery
under the statutes:
The three statutes mentioned above . . clearly enunciate
a public policy against discrimination in employment on the ba-
sis of age. It is but a short step to conclude that an action which
violates such a clear public policy is a breach of an implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. Since Massachusetts law,
as well as federal law, plainly manifests a public policy against
age discrimination in employment, it would be a striking limita-
tion on the scope of the implied covenant if it were held inap-
plicable to a decision to terminate because of age. Moreover, it
would be extraordinarily difficult to defend in principle a dis-
tinction that treats the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
as applying, at least potentially, to other termination decisions
generally but not to those based on age discrimination.
48
The court concluded that Massachusetts courts-by embracing a tort
46. Under the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practice Act, a complaint must be filed
by an aggrieved employee with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
within six months after an act of discrimination. The filing of the complaint is followed by
an investigation by the Commission. If no probable cause is found by the Commission, the
complaint is dismissed. If probable cause is found, the Commission may bring a civil ac-
tion against the offending employer in Superior Court, or may endeavor to resolve the
matter through conciliation. If conciliation fails, a notice of hearing may be issued to an
employer, followed by an evidentiary hearing, and an order of the Commission. See MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1982). An order of the Commission may be appealed
to the Superior Court. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 6 (West 1982). The Act
expressly provides that, "as to acts declared unlawful by section four [the substantive
prohibitions of the Act], the procedure[s] provided in this chapter shall, while pending, be
exclusive .. " See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1982).
In order to bring an action under the ADEA, the employee must file a charge of age
discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within
180 days after the alleged age discrimination, or within 300 days after the alleged age
discrimination, in "deferral" states that have laws prohibiting age discrimination in em-
ployment and state agencies authorized to grant or seek relief from employers for age
discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). The EEOC is required to investigate charges
of age discrimination, and to attempt to resolve any disputes through conciliation, confer-
ence, and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Actions under the ADEA may be
brought in federal court by the EEOC or, once a charge has been on file with the EEOC
for 60 days, an individual charging party. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), (d) (1982). The interrela-
tionship between state age discrimination laws and agencies and the EEOC and the ADEA
is intricate, see 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1982), and the states should be wary of creating age dis-
crimination remedies inconsistent with the administrative and judicial system created by
Congress.
47. 491 F. Supp. at 1120.
48. Id. at 1121.
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theory of wrongful discharge-so dramatically changed the preexisting
law (both statutory and common law), that the plaintiff's wrongful dis-
charge tort claim was proper.
49
The third decision involving a public policy wrongful discharge
claim based on employment discrimination statutes is Lucas v. Brown &
Root, Inc.50 There, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to sexual
harassment and ultimately discharged from her employment because of
her refusal to accede to her supervisor's sexual demands. Three legal
bases for relief were alleged by the plaintiff: (1) sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51 (2) violation of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 52 and (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The federal district court, exercising di-
versity jurisdiction over the Arkansas state law claims, dismissed the Ti-
tle VII claim as untimely. 53 The wrongful discharge and emotional
distress claims were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Title VII ruling,
but reversed the decision on the Arkansas state law claims. In support
of this decision, the court initially overstated: "[T]he Arkansas Supreme
Court has indicated a willingness to recognize a public policy exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine."' 54 The court then held that the
49. The court seemed to place much emphasis on the fact that the Fortune case, see
supra notes 33 & 45, was decided after Congress and the Massachusetts General Assembly
enacted the statutes creating administrative and judicial remedies for victims of age dis-
crimination. In Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court placed much emphasis on the fact
that its state courts had adopted a public policy wrongful discharge theory before the Ore-
gon legislature enacted comprehensive statutes dealing with sex discrimination in employ-
ment. 689 P.2d at 1303. See also Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287, 293
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (if public policy not recognized before statutes enacted, statutes were
likely intended to provide exclusive remedies). Neither decision cited any legal authority
for its position. This contradiction may simply suggest that, if one wishes, one may read
the legislative history of a statute in any way conducive to the desired outcome.
50. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
52. The court analyzed this claim as a public policy wrongful discharge claim. 736
F.2d at 1204-05.
53. Title VII has strict time limitations on its administrative and judicial proceedings.
A charge of employment discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the E.E.O.C.
within 180 days, or-in states with employment discrimination laws and agencies to en-
force such laws-300 days, following the alleged discrimination, as under the ADEA. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). See also supra note 46. After the Commission investigates the
charge and attempts conciliation, the E.E.O.C. may bring a civil action against the em-
ployer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982), or may issue a notice of right to sue to the charging
party, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). The charging party has 90 days following his
receipt of the notice of right to sue to commence his federal district court action. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). See generally Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984) (to toll running of 90-day period plaintiff must file a complaint).
Many courts hold that, the 90-day filing rule is not simply a limitations period, but ajuris-
dictional prerequisite, such that failure to comply therewith deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hall v. Kroger Baking Co., 520 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975); Genovese v. Shell Oil
Co., 488 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. 736 F.2d at 1204. Arkansas case law and statutes made clear that Arkansas was an
at will employment state. See Miller v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 225 Ark. 475, 283
S.W.2d 158 (1955); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-310 (1976).
In support of its conclusion, the court cited M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596
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plaintiff's discharge violated public policy because of an Arkansas prosti-
tution statute. 55 Having concluded that the plaintiff would be a prosti-
tute, under the statute, if she had acceded to her supervisor's sexual
demands, the court held that it would violate public policy to permit the
defendant to terminate the plaintiff for refusing to commit a criminal
act.56
IV. PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
To the extent that the courts are presently encouraged to create
private causes of action to redress employment terminations violating
public policy, the courts should be equally cognizant of public policies
mitigating against the adoption of the public policy theory. Further, in
any given case, if a discharged worker asserts that his termination con-
travened public policy, the courts-when considering the claim-should
give consideration to competing public policies. For a number of inter-
related policy reasons, common law wrongful discharge claims ad-
dressed by the federal and state employment discrimination statutes
should be repudiated.
First, decisions such as Holien, McKinney, and Lucas overlook the fact
that the public policy wrongful discharge theory was formulated by the
courts in response to situations where discharged workers had no other
S.W.2d 681 (1980). It takes great effort to read the M.B.M. decision as "indicating a will-
ingness to recognize" a public policy wrongful discharge theory. In that case, an employee
working under an express written at will employment contract was terminated on suspi-
cion of theft when money and checks were missing from the cash register. Although the
worker successfully completed a polygraph examination, the employer stood by his dis-
charge decision. The court rejected the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim, holding
that-even if it accepted the public policy theory, in principle-the plaintiff had demon-
strated no public policy contravened by the discharge. In this setting. the court made the
statement that it "might" adopt the public policy cause of action if a plaintiff demonstrated
the implication of a public policy right or duty; because the plaintiff failed to come even
close to a showing of a right or duty, the hypothetical raised by the court did not have to
be addressed. However, in Lucas, the Eighth Circuit elevated this hypothetical into a "rec-
ognition" of the public policy theory. 736 F.2d at 1204.
55. "A person commits prostitution if in return for, or in expectation of a fee, he
engages in or agrees or offers to engage in sexual activity with any other person." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3002(1) (Supp. 1983).
56. In response to the employer's contention that such a ruling effectively permitted
sexual harassment claimants to flaunt the procedural limitations on such claims imposed
by Congress in Title VII, the court ruled that the federal law expressly permits the co-
existence of state discrimination laws. 736 F.2d at 1205-06.
The court's reliance on Section 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982), is mis-
placed. First, that statutory provision relates to the co-existence of state and federal sub-
stantive laws prohibiting discrimination, while different provisions of Title VII govern the
interrelationship between the federal and state administrative and judicial procedures. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982) (EEOC procedurally required to defer action on charge to
state fair employment practice agencies prior to issuance of notice of right to sue and
federal court litigation); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70-.80 (1984) (federal regulations regarding
EEOC deferral to qualified state employment discrimination agencies). Second, the
court's ruling gives more dignity to the Arkansas prostitution statutes than they deserve.
They are not state discrimination laws; in fact, Arkansas does not even have an employment
discrimination statute.
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means of legal recourse, either under common law or by statute. 57 The
importance of the unavailability of alternative legal remedies is under-
scored by the fact that, in a number ofjurisdictions, such unavailability is
an express element of the public policy cause of action. As stated by one
Pennsylvania federal district court:
The cases which have established a tort or contract remedy for
employees discharged for reasons violative of public policy
have relied upon the fact that in the context of their case the
employee was otherwise without remedy and that permitting
the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social
policy to go unvindicated.
It is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the
public policy exception is the vindication or the protection of
certain strong policies of the community. If these policies or
goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is
sufficiently served. Therefore, application of the public policy
exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate
some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no
remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or
society. 58
When a wrongful discharge plaintiff asserts that he or she has been
discriminated against on the basis of a factor proscribed by a federal or
state statute, and when the statute provides judicial or administrative
remedies to the employee, the very foundation for the development of
public policy law is missing. To recognize the public policy theory in
situations where statutory relief-such as the fair employment practice
laws-is available would be, not to fill in the gaps for employees unpro-
tected by the statutes, but rather, to overlap existing remedies. In such
situations, the theory should not be extended.
An illustrative case on this point is Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc.,5 9 in
which a federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's implied contract
and abusive discharge claims under Maryland law, when the claims were
premised on the public policy against age bias arising from the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Fair Employment Prac-
tice Act of Maryland. 60 Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland had
previously recognized the tort of "abusive discharge," 6 1 the court held
57. See Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3688, 3690 (D. Kan. 1984).
58. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-55 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1984); Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 139, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 3690; Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
295, 296-97 (D. Md. 1982); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 917
(E.D. Mich. 1977). Contra, e.g., Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
Vasques also questioned whether employment discrimination is subject to public policy
analysis, insofar as it does not conform with the "duties" and "rights" framework. 34 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 297. See supra text accompanying notes 12-31.
59. 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (Supp. 1984).
61. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). See also
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982).
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the theory inapposite because it was limited to situations "when public
policy is violated but where a statutory exception to [the at will employ-
ment rule has] not already been provided." 6 2 Courts from numerous
jurisdictions have followed the same analysis. 6 3 Such a holding is not
surprising; it is difficult to conceive of a public policy which favors creat-
ing duplicative legal remedies under the guise of formulating a legal
remedy where one did not previously exist.
64
Of the three equal employment opportunity public policy cases dis-
cussed above, Holien and McKinney are the most disturbing, when consid-
eration is given to this factor. In Oregon and Massachusetts, elaborate
remedies had been provided under fair employment practice statutes. 65
Recognizing the plaintiffs' tort claims in those cases was not an effort by
the courts to advance an interstitial legal theory to avoid having wrongs
go legally unredressed; the rulings created duplicative legal remedies,
contrary to the very foundation of public policy wrongful discharge
law.
6 6
At first blush, the decision in Lucas does not seem as inappropriate
as the other two cases, when consideration is given to this public policy
factor, because there are no Arkansas state laws addressing the subject
of sex discrimination. 6 7 However, the public policy theory has devel-
oped because of the unavailability of legal remedies (both state and fed-
eral) to terminated employees. Public policy wrongful discharge law
should not tread on an area where federal statutory relief is available.
68
No public policy is served by stretching state prostitution laws to ad-
62. 575 F. Supp. at 717.
63. See, e.g., Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 919 (3d Cir.
1982); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1977); Pierce v. New
Process Co., 580 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc.,
586 F. Supp. 324, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Crews v. Memorex Corp., No. 83-3750-T (D.
Mass., May 24, 1984); Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. at 145; Watkins
v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 585 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Tarr v. Riberglass,
Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3690; Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, 34 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 296-97; McCluney v.Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24, 26-27
(E.D. Wis. 1980); Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Schroe-
der v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 917; Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp.
at 1054-55.
64. "We doubt that Pennsylvania courts would find the creation of such duplicative
litigation fosters the policy of the Pennsylvania [Human Relations] Act." Wehr v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. at 1056.
65. See supra notes 36, 38-39, 44, 46.
66. The Hoiien decision is particularly flawed in this respect. The Oregon Supreme
Court, in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977), ex-
pressly held that the wrongful discharge tort theory should not be extended to an em-
ployee who was terminated for protesting safety violations because existing Oregon and
federal statutes provided relief to the worker. Nevertheless, the court in Holien chose to
disregard the teachings of W17alsh by delving into the question of the adequacy of the statu-
tory remedies for employment discrimination.
67. See supra note 56.
68. There was no dispute in Lucas that the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment could
have been remedied by Title VII. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see also supra
note 41. The plaintiff's Title VII claim was unsuccessful, not due to the unavailability of
federal remedies, but because of her failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
of Title VII. See supra note 53.
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dress the subject of sex discrimination in employment, when such dis-
crimination is directly remedied by Title VII, if not a state discrimination
law.
6 9
A second public policy calling for the rejection of public policy em-
ployment discrimination claims, which is closely related to the first, is
that the fair employment practice statutes enacted by the states were
typically intended by the legislatures to be the exclusive source of state
legal relief for victims of discrimination. When adopting the fair em-
ployment practice acts, the legislatures were specifically confronted with
the problem of how best to remedy employment discrimination, and in
most instances, opted in favor of elaborate administrative and judicial
proceedings providing relief to employees. A number of courts have
recognized that the legislatures' creation of such extensive remedies re-
flects an intention to make the remedies exclusive. For example, the
United States District Court in the Northern District of California, in
Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 70 granted defendants' motion for par-
tial summary judgment and ruled that the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (CFEHA)7 1 was intended by the California legislature
to preempt the field of remedies in areas it addressed:
Where the Legislature has provided a comprehensive remedial
scheme, there is a strong indication that the legislature in-
tended the remedy to be exclusive.
[Ilt clearly appears that the Legislature intended that the rem-
edy for age discrimination created by the CFEHA be exclusive.
The CFEHA remedy is specific and detailed, thus indicating its
exclusive nature. . . . Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Leg-
islature specially stated that the CFEHA was intended to pro-
vide a remedy for the discriminations it prohibited. This is a
strong indication that the Legislature intended the remedy it
created for age discrimination under the CFEHA to be
exclusive.
72
Similarly, in Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc.,7 3 the court held that the
Maryland General Assembly barred wrongful discharge litigation based
69. As noted above, in Lucas, the court saved its conscience by making reference to
Section 708 of Title VII, the federal-state co-existence provision. See supra note 56. If the
issue in Lucas had been resolution of a conflict between the substantive employment dis-
crimination law of Arkansas and the substantive terms of Title VII, Section 708 would have
been meaningful. However, the issue was not the conflict of substantive law. Rather, one
problem arising from the ruling was the circumvention of Title VII's Section 706 proce-
dures. See supra note 56 and discussion infra text accompanying notes 78-94. Another
problem was that the court, rather than looking to the substantive law most directly ad-
dressing the subject of sex discrimination in the workplace, Title VII, chose to rely upon a
state criminal statute of doubtful application to the record facts.
70. 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983). See supra note 49.
71. CAL. Govr. CODE § § 12900-12906 (West 1980). The procedural provisions of the
CFEHA, §§ 12960-12976, are similar to those in the Oregon and Massachusetts statutes at
issue in Holien and McKinney. See supra notes 36, 38-39, 44, 46.
72. 571 F. Supp. at 293-94.
73. 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983). See also supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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on the public policy against age discrimination when it adopted the
Maryland Human Relations Act:
In enacting Article 49B, the Maryland General Assembly
created an elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme for
the investigation and disposition of employment discrimination
claims, including claims of discrimination based on age. Article
49B, sections 9, 10, and 11 set forth the administrative proce-
dures in Maryland for relief in such cases. The Maryland
Human Relations Commission is empowered under the statute
to award monetary relief for violations thereof. Md. Ann.
Code, Art. 49B, § 11 (e).
[W]hen a statutory scheme provides a remedy for injury, that
statutory scheme provides an exclusive remedy which preempts
application of general civil common law, absent indication by
the legislature to the contrary.
74
Mahoney and Chekey are only two of many cases recognizing that legisla-
tures-when adopting elaborate remedial systems for employment dis-
crimination-intended to preempt the field.
75
Decisions such as Holien and McKinney not only fly in the face of
comprehensive remedial systems created by state legislatures and Con-
gress, 76 but statutory language confirming the exclusivity of the statu-
tory relief.77 The decisions derogate the efforts of legislative bodies.
The third, and most critical, public policy against the use of fair
employment practice statutes to create public policy wrongful discharge
claims is that such claims permit plaintiffs to circumvent the procedural
requirements for employment discrimination actions established by
74. 575 F. Supp. at 716-17. See also Soley v. Commission on Human Relations, 277
Md. 521, 356 A.2d 254 (1976); Dillon v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 403
A.2d 406 (1979).
75. See also Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2421 (C.D. Cal.
1984); Galbraith v. Philips Information Sys., Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519, 2521 (E.D.
Pa. 1984); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Carrillo v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Il. 1982); McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. at 26-27; Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at
914; Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523-24
(1983); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 11. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (1984).
Much of the recent litigation dealing with the interaction of state employment discrim-
ination statutes and state public policy wrongful discharge law has arisen in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 &
Supp. 1965-1983) contains exclusivity provisions similar to those of the Massachusetts Fair
Employment Practice Act, see supra note 46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) & (c) (Purdon
1964 & Supp. 1965-1983). Although some have contended that the PHRA is the exclusive
remedy for victims of discrimination, only if they invoke its protections, the courts have
held that PHRA is the single remedy for discrimination, even when employees do not seek
relief under the Act. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d at 223-24; Bruffett v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d at 919-21; Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d at 195 n.9; Galbraith v. Philips Information Sys., Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519,
2521 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. at 328-29. Naturally,
the courts also hold that the PHRA remedies are exclusive when complainants invoke the
protections of the Act. See, e.g., Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 912-13
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
76. See supra notes 36, 46 & 53.
77. See supra notes 39 & 46.
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Congress and the state legislatures. Even if the statutes were not in-
tended to be the exclusive source of substantive law to remedy employ-
ment discrimination, as discussed above, their administrative and
judicial procedures presumably were not designed to be ignored. The
timely filing of any agency charge, notice of the charge to the employer,
agency investigation, agency hearing, reasonable cause determination,
attempted conciliation, issuance of a notice of right to sue, and timely
commencement of a civil action by the employer or the agency, 78 are
required processes under the fair employment practice laws; their im-
portance is widely recognized. As stated by a Florida federal district
court:
The court views each one of the deliberate steps in the statu-
tory scheme-charge, notice, investigation, reasonable cause,
conciliation-as intended by Congress to be a condition prece-
dent to the next succeeding step and ultimately legal action.
Certainly, the E.E.O.C. does not contend that it could skip one
or more of these steps at will. The language of the Act is
mandatory as to each step and the Commission must complete
each step before moving to the next.
79
To permit a plaintiff to assert a public policy against employment dis-
crimination, premised on fair employment practice laws, without requir-
ing compliance with the procedural limitations of such laws on the
plaintiffs claims is to permit the picking and choosing of legal relief, in
violation of legislative wishes.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bruffett v. Warner Communica-
tion, Inc.,80 analyzed the importance of this factor when affirming the
dismissal of a discharged employee's age discrimination public policy
claim. The court, in painstaking detail, isolated the various bases for
dismissal, and concluded that-not only did the Pennsylvania legislature
intend the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act to be the exclusive sub-
stantive remedy available to age discrimination claimants in the
state8 I-consideration of such a claim "would give the claimant an op-
portunity to circumvent the carefully drafted legislative procedures" of
the PHRA.
82
There are many dramatic differences between an employment dis-
crimination action under a fair employment statute and under the public
policy theory.8 3 Probably the most striking procedural distinction be-
tween the employment discrimination laws and the public policy theory
78. See supra notes 36, 46 & 53.
79. EEOC v. Container Corp. of Am., 352 F. Supp. 262, 265 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
80. 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 63 and 75.
81. See supra note 64.
82. 692 F.2d at 919. See also Tombollo v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23, 25 (S.D. 1984);
Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. at 145.
83. One major substantive difference is recoverable damages. Exemplary damages
are typically not available under the equal employment opportunity laws. See, e.g.,Johnson
v. Al Tech Specialities Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1984) (ADEA); Shah v. Mt. Zion
Hosp., 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d
1150 (10th Cir. 1976) (Title VII). By contrast, punitive damages are recoverable under
the public policy theory. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610
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involves the applicable statutes of limitation. For example, under the
federal equal employment opportunity laws, the charge normally must
be filed with the E.E.O.C. within 180 days following the alleged discrimi-
nation. 84 A 300-day limitations period is applicable, under some cir-
cumstances, in "deferral" states. 8 5 A judicial action must be
commenced within a brief period of time following completion of the
administrative process. 86 By contrast, the public policy claims asserted
by wrongful discharge plaintiffs are commonly governed by much longer
limitations periods. 87 If courts permit plaintiffs to raise public policy
employment discrimination claims, after failure to comply with fair em-
ployment practice law procedures, claims considered untimely by the
legislatures will be resurrected by the courts.
88
Of the three cases basing public policy claims on allegations of em-
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). In the Holien case, for example, the plaintiff was
awarded $25,000 in punitive damages. See supra note 40.
A similar conflict on emotional injury damages exists. Compare Wiskotoni v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank-West, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2596 (6th Cir. 1983) with Ferrell v. Finance Am.
Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984) (no compensatory damages under ADEA).
The absence of such remedies in the discrimination statutes reflects legislative opposi-
tion, not neutrality, to the relief. Cf. Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 38 Colo. App. 286,
559 P.2d 716 (1976).
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1982). See supra
notes 46 & 53.
85. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1982). See generally Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (discussion of time limits for filing claim in "deferral
states").
86. Title VII plaintiffs must bring their civil actions within 90 days following receipt of
a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). See supra note
53. Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must bring a civil action against the employer within two
years (three years, if the violation of the Act is willful) of the alleged discrimination. A
minimum period of 60 days of EEOC investigation and conciliation is required. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (1982).
87. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110(l)(a), (d), (g) (1973) (six-year period); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 11.190.2(c), 11.190.3(c) (1983) (four-year period for actions on contract not
in writing and three-year period for actions to recover personal property); Wyo. STAT. § 1-
3-105(a)(ii)(A), (iv)(B), (iv)(C) (1977) (eight-year period for actions on contract not in writ-
ing, four-year period for actions to recover personal property or redress injury to plain-
tiff's rights).
The Holien case provides an excellent example of the problem. A public policy claim
is timely in Oregon for six years, OR. REV. STAT. § 12.080 (1981), while a statutory com-
plaint must be filed within one year of the alleged discrimination. See supra note 36.
88. A major question for future resolution is whether the substantive law under the
discrimination statutes should be followed in public policy cases. Section 708 of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982). suggests that state substantive law may differ from, and yet
co-exist with, Title VII law. However, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that state
law should not be enforced when it is in conflict with federal law. See 110 CONG. REC.
S7205, 7215-18, 7243-46 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964) (statements of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case);
110 CONG. REC. R1521 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). The ADEA
does not contain a provision comparable to Section 708, but has a highly ambiguous provi-
sion concerning the preemptive effect of an ADEA suit over "any State action." 29 U.S.C.
633(a) (1982). This provision may signify that the EEOC administrative process is exclu-
sive once a federal charge has been filed. Alternatively, the provision could be interpreted
to mean that substantive federal age discrimination law has preemptive effect over, and is
controlling on, the substantive age discrimination law of the states.
The Lucas opinion indicated that Title VII substantive law would apply to the liability
issue of the public policy claim. See 116 LRRM at 2746 n.3. This approach makes emi-
nently good sense. Otherwise, it seems, both the substantive and procedural terms of a
statute creating a public policy could be disregarded by a public policy claimant. However,
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ployment discrimination, discussed above, the Lucas case most dramati-
cally demonstrates the procedural circumvention problem.8 9 When the
plaintiff brought her Title VII sexual harassment action one day beyond
the federal limitations period, and when Arkansas statutes provided her
with no remedy for sexual harassment, the court was compelled to pro-
vide her with a cause of action based on criminal laws not directly deal-
ing with the substance of her claim. 9 ° After properly enforcing federal
law and taking the plaintiff's discrimination claim away with one hand,
the court gave her a windfall with the other.
A very similar case giving full consideration to the procedural re-
quirements of the fair employment practice laws is Schroeder v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp.9 1 There, the plaintiff commenced untimely claims under
the ADEA and the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act. 9 2 She as-
serted a separate discrimination claim, relying upon the public policies
expressed in the statutes. The claim was appropriately dismissed on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in part, because the plaintiff's public policy claim
was an apparent attempt to exploit the benefits of the statutes, 9 3 without
satisfying the procedural requirements of the statutes. The import of
such compliance was recently articulated by the United States Supreme
Court: "[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to
the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guar-
antee of evenhanded administration of the law."
94
The fourth public policy militating against public policy claims pre-
mised on fair employment practice statutes is federalism. It is interest-
ing to note that most of the decisions in this area are from the federal
courts. In such instances, of course, they are called upon to rule as the
state courts would rule if confronted with the problem of interpreting
the common law and the effect of state and federal statutes on the devel-
opment of that common law. 9 5 The federal courts are required to fol-
low state substantive law, regardless of its harsh effects, 9 6 and even if
they challenge its wisdom. 9 7 Most importantly, state law is not to be
in Holien, the court expressed no concern over the disparate damages law advanced by its
ruling. See supra notes 40 & 83.
89. Also, the court in McKinney frankly acknowledged the circumvention problem and
declared: "Courts should not lightly undertake action that would alter the balance the
legislatures have struck." 491 F. Supp. at 1120. Of course, having made this declaration,
the court then altered the balance struck by Congress and the Massachusetts General
Assembly.
90. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
91. 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977). See supra notes 58, 63 & 75.
92. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.301-.311 (West 1955) (current version at
§§ 37.201-37.2801 (West 1984)).
93. 448 F. Supp. at 913-14.
94. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 1726 (1984) (quoting
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
95. See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Hackbart v. Cin-
cinnati Bengals,Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 522 (10th Cir. 1979); Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1976); Heeney v. Miller, 421 F.2d 434,
439 (8th Cir. 1970).
96. See, e.g., Parson v. United States, 460 F. 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1972).
97. See, e.g., Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170, 1173 (6th Cir. 1977); Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 874 (8th Cir. 1966).
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created or changed.9 8 "One of the authentic obligations of federalism
at the judicial level requires that [federal courts] permit the state courts
to decide whether and to what extent they will follow the emerging
law." 99
A recent decision from the federal district court in Utah, Amos v.
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 0 0 typifies the deference federal courts
should give state courts in the development of public policies. There,
five employees of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints per-
forming secular work were allegedly discharged for religious reasons.
The plaintiffs asserted that the terminations violated Title VII and state
employment discrimination statutes,' 0 ' and a compelling public policy
against religious discrimination. The federal district court-while deny-
ing the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the statutory
claims-dismissed the wrongful discharge claim, because adoption of
the tort theory would invade the province of the Utah state courts.
Although this court has the duty and power to mold the
laws of this state when applying uncertain state law, . . . it may
not change existing state law. . . . [T]he long history of the
Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the terminable-at-will
doctrine, the language the court has used in dismissing those
cases and the failure of the court to ever suggest that it might
recognize an exception to that rule lead this court to the con-
clusion that the recognition of an exception to the terminable-
at-will doctrine would be a change in Utah law. . . . The Utah
Supreme Court may decide to recognize an exception in the
future, but this court is not at liberty to determine what Utah
law ought to be.
0 2
Unfortunately, this type of judicial restraint is not always exercised.
State court judges (and employers) in Arkansas, for example, were un-
doubtedly startled to learn-via the wisdom of a federal court of appeals
in Lucas-that the public policy wrongful discharge theory existed in the
state, that a plaintiff could assert a public policy claim for wrongful dis-
charge after failing to satisfy the procedural requirements of a federal
statute dealing most directly with the discharge, and that state prostitu-
tion laws could be the basis for a wrongful discharge civil action.
10 3
Public policy issues are state issues; interference by the federal courts in
the development of the states' common law is inexcusable. '
0 4
98. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 314 (10th Cir. 1978); System Opera-
tions, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1142 (3d Cir. 1977); Mills v.
Hoflicht, 465 F.2d 29, 30 (10th Cir. 1972); Schultz & Lindsay Const. Co. v. Erickson, 352
F.2d 425, 435 (8th Cir. 1965); Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1962).
99. Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d at 920.
100. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2744 (D. Utah 1984).
101. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-1 to -8 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
102. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2770.
103. It is interesting to note that the Arkansas Supreme Court, in at will employment
cases after Lucas, has not even mentioned the decision. See Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282
Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984); Gaulden v. Emerson Elec. Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680
S.W.2d 92 (1984).
104. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 538 F. Supp. at 799; Chekey v. BTR Realty,
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V. CONCLUSION
Although most courts have held to the contrary, some recent judi-
cial opinions have accepted public policy wrongful discharge claims pre-
mised on allegations of employment discrimination, notwithstanding the
existence of state and federal statutes expressly addressing such discrim-
ination. To permit such claims for relief disregards the historical devel-
opment of the public policy theory. Further, it overlooks the legislative
intent to make the fair enjployment practice laws the exclusive source of
relief for employment discrimination victims, and permits the wholesale
circumvention of procedural systems devised by the legislative bodies.
When employees are subject to discrimination proscribed by state or
federal statute, the remedies provided by such statutes should be exclu-
sive and should not be utilized as the springboard for expansion of tort
common law.
Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3282; Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA),
L.R.R.M. at 3078; Brainard v. Imperial Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.R.I. 1983).
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